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Abstract

This thesis examines the problem of failed and failing states set against the
'theory' that has accompanied this discourse. It uses a case study of Papua New
Guinea (PNG) to examine both the theory and its related application in the Failed
States Index (FSI) developed by the Fund for Peace and the Foreign Policy
magazme.

Critically examining the methodology used in the FSI, the thesis analysis a wide
range of information about the social, economic and political problems facing
PNG to highlight shortcomings in the current construction of the Index. These
shortcomings are then used to highlight conceptual problems in the construction
of categories in failed state 'theory': weak, failing failed. Whereas PNG has been
designated a weak state, the thesis argues that this categorisation is ambiguous
and, possibly, inaccurate.
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Introduction

Located on Australia's doorstep, the island nation of Papua New Guinea (PNG) is
at a crossroads. Praised for remaining among the community of democratic
nations, it faces a range of challenges that threaten its stability. Many of these
challenges are the products of a truly unique country with deep, ongoing traditions
being transformed into a modem nation. As stated by Fullerton (2006, p. 515)
"Papua New Guinea is a different place, a place where highly evolved societies
have been dragged into economic modernity by colonial powers and then by the
expectations of the development community".

PNG is a nation made up from a large number of islands with the main land mass
being the eastern half of the island of New Guinea 1• It is a former colony of
Australia and it has since its independence in 1975 remained a democratic
country, but one where traditional customs have survived (AusAID, 2006, p. 53).
The population ofPNG has in 2006 reached 5.6 million with a continuously rapid
increase rate of around 2.5 percent each year (May, 2006, p. 152; Samana, 1988,
p. 61; The World Fact Book, 2006, online). Eighty-five percent of the population
live in rural areas where the traditional forms of social organisation into tribes,
clans and their sub-groups are still dominant. In these areas local tribe and clan
leaders hold the authority, and the influence ofthe state is weak (AusAID, 2000,
p. 20; May, 2006, p. 152).

1

See map on p. xi.
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PNG is one of the world's most fragmented societies and although there is no
exact figure on how many ethnic groups exist, Reilly argues that "informed
observers" have estimated the number to be in the region of 5,000 to 7,000
separate groups, often referred to as 'tribes' or 'clans' (Reilly, 2000, p. 175).
There are over 800 different languages and thousands of dialects spoken in PNG
(Samana, 1988, pp. 61-62) and, due to dramatic geographical terrain made up
from mountain ranges and deep valleys, many clans have traditionally lived rather
isolated from other clans with inter-clan warfare being the primary point of
contact2 (May, 2006, p. 152; Reilly, 2000, p.175. A high level of social
fragmentation and ethnic diversity has often been linked to democratic instability
by political scholars and policy makers (Reilly, 2000, pp. 162-163). In PNG,
however, the high level of social fragmentation has had both a positive and a
negative impact on the nation's political stability.

PNG was colonised in 1884 by Germany and Great Britain3 . Australia took over
the administration ofthe British part in 1906 and the German part in 19144 and
the Australian colony was established. PNG gained its independence from
Australia on the 161h of September 197 5 and thereby its new constitution came
into effect, through which PNG adopted a Westminster-style parliamentary
system. This constitution was a product of extensive research undertaken by the
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), which had been established by Sir
Michael Somare in 1972 after he had become the Chief Minister of the PNG
2

According to Lemonnier (1991, pp. 8-9), this type of warfare in PNG has not traditionally been
oriented towards total conquest and extermination but can be regarded as a milder form of
competitive activity.
3
PNG was split with Germany colonising the nmihem half and Great Britain colonising the
southern part (Wanek, .1996, p. 29).
4
Australia conquered the German part ofPNG in 1914 and it was formally given to Australia as a
Trust Area by the League of Nations after WWI (Wanek, 1996, p. 35).
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House of Assembli. The CPC was created to ensure that the constitution that
would be adopted by the independent PNG would be as true to Papua New
Guinean ideals and values as possible. In the words of Somare : "I urged the
establishment of the CPC because I wanted to ensure that independence, when it
finally came, would be true independence, approved by our own people and
reflected in a constitution of our own making" (Somare, 2001, p. 16). As a result,
a variety of political parties were founded with their main differences being the
geography and culture of their origins (Moore, 2003, p. 197).

It has been argued that the very nature of its fragmented society has provided
PNG with a political climate where democracy can prevail; its society is simply
too fragmented to produce any one group that is strong enough to dominate or
challenge the political system on a nationallevel 6 (Reilly, 2000, p. 167). The
elected members of the PNG Parliament reflect the large number of separate
ethnic groups in the country and this has contributed to every government to date
being a coalition. No group is strong enough to take over power in a way that
would be unconstitutional and PNG can therefore be regarded as a successfully
functioning democracy. On the other hand, because of the social fragmentation,
factors usually associated with democratic systems have posed severe threats to
PNG's political stability; notably the problems of the weak party system and the
first-past-the-post electoral system, both of which has ensured a continuing trend
ofweak coalition governments.

5

The House of Assembly was the forerunner to the PNG parliament. Its members were elected by
the people ofPNG, but had no real national power under the Australian rule pre-independence.
6
Reilly uses a study ofl>NG to argue that social fragmentation is not a factor that will always
undermine democracy, but that it can work in the exact opposite way.
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PNG then is a 'different' country facing some obvious political, economic and
social challenges. It is currently classified as a 'weak' state by some expe1is, with
others discussing the real threat ofPNG failing as a state7 (Denoon, 2005, pp.
178-179). For this to have any meaning, there needs to be an agreement on what is
meant when referring to a state as 'weak', 'failing' or 'failed'. The discourse on
state failure has been around for some time, evolving over time as the everchanging international political climate has produced new scenarios of states
failing. In recent years, this discourse has been given increased attention.

This honours thesis will examine the problem of failed and failing states; the
'theory' that has developed over recent years and its practical application to PNG.
The 'theory' is relatively new and it has the potential to play a large part in
international politics. In 2005, the current affairs magazine Foreign Policy
together with the Fund for Peace, a research and educational organisation that
works to prevent war, produced the Failed States Index (FSI) based on the ideas
of failed state theory. The Index assesses countries, using a set of indicators and
rates them accordingly to determine whether or not they are failed states. This
thesis will explore the applicability and usefulness of this index by analysing its
assessment ofPNG.

The main problem to be examined in the thesis is:
);;>

How failed state theory is represented in the FSI and to what extent

the Index is relevant to PNG.

7

See Denoon, 2005, pp·. 178-179 for a discussion on several experts' opinions on PNG's status as
a weak or failing state.
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This problem will be approached through a set of four research questions:

1) What is failed state theory and how is it incorporated in the PSI?
2) What is the fudex methodology in assessing a specific country?
3) What are some of the key shortcomings ofthe Index and how are
these apparent in the Index's assessment of PNG- political,
economic and social issues?
4) How does a case study ofPNG contribute to an evaluation of the
usefulness of the fudex?

The problem of failed and weak states is a global issue that requires global
attention. As it would be much more expensive to restore an already failed state
than it would be to 'save' a weak state, it is important to understand the nature of
state failure and detect the signs of a weak state in danger of failing (Straw, 2006,
online).

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001· changed the way in which the western
world regarded the problem of failed states (Dunlap, 2004, online; Patrick, 2006a,
p. 27). Failed and weak states have now become a key issue in international
security politics as they are widely perceived as being perfect hosts for terrorists
and other forms of organised crime (Krasner & Pascual, 2005, p. 153; Mallaby,
2002, online). They are also horne to a majority of all violent conflicts, producing
millions of people living in extremely poor conditions and contributing to a global
humanitarian problem (The African Studies Centre et al, 2003, online).

5

The PSI has the potential to be a useful tool in analysing state failure and
identifying countries that are at risk of failing. As the Index is relatively new,
having been founded only last year, its effectiveness has yet to be proven. Its
assessments of different countries need to be analysed in order to provide
conclusions on the usefulness of the Index and this thesis is aimed at reaching
some of these conclusions by analysing the PSI's application to PNG.

PNG is geographically Australia's closest neighbour and its stability, or lack
thereof, is important to Australia and the South Pacific region. At the moment,
PNG is not recognised as a failed state, with the PSI identifying PNG as a weak
state (Failed States Index, 2006c, online). However, it seems to share several of
the symptoms connected with failed state theory and therefore PNG's status needs
to be further analysed.

Australia is PNG's largest aid donor, contributing around $300 million in aid each
year (Morris and Stewart, 2005, online). The aid effort needs to be effective if
PNG is to avoid remaining a weak state or, worse, slide into state failure.
According to Hawksley (2006, p. 161), the Australian govermnent fears that the
state ofPNG may collapse. Therefore, it is crucial for Australia to fully
understand the nature and implications of failed state theory as it applies to PNG.

The primary aim of this thesis is to provide a discussion on failed state theory and
an assessment of the usefulness of the PSI. Due to the limitations of an honours
thesis, the case study ofPNG does not aim to provide a full assessment of the

6

country but rather it uses some key issues in PNG to evaluate the PSI. All
conclusions will therefore be primarily related to the failed state theory and the
Index, and only secondary to PNG 8 .

The resources used for this thesis can be divided into three groups: those
concerning failed states, those concerning PNG, and resources directly provided
by the PSI. The aim has been to merge the information from primary sources with
that of secondary sources to provide an original analysis of failed state theory, the
Index and its application to PNG.

The first two groups of resources include books, journal articles, government
reports and reports from international organisations such as the UN and the IMP.
The second group also includes articles from the PNG newspaper The Post

Courier. Some notable authors are Robert I. Rotberg, expert on state failure, and
Sinclair Dinnen, Ron J. May and Ben Reilly, experts on various aspects ofPNG.

The third group consists of material made available online by the PSI. This may
have been published either on the Foreign Policy or the Fund for Peace website.
As both websites contain frequent cross-referencing to each other as well as
copies ofthe same material, all information from these websites will be in-text
referenced as 'Failed States Index' with the appropriate web addresses provided in
the end-text bibliography. The information on the PSI, its methodology and its
assessment ofPNG, has been limited to what is currently published on the

8

There are several other issues in PNG that would have to be considered for a complete analysis
of the country, such as impacts of colonialism, gender inequalities, involvement of TNCs in
natural resources industries like mining and timber, and problems related to the under-funding of
the police force and the PNGDF.

7

Foreign Policy or the Fund for Peace websites as there are yet to emerge
secondary sources that critically examine the Index.

As a sound understanding ofPNG history and culture was required for this thesis,
a number of anthropology as well as history texts have been consulted. As
specified by Yin (2003, pp. 59-61) researchers need to have a firm grasp of the
issues being studied to be able to correctly collect and analyse relevant data (Yin,
2003, pp. 59-61, 111-112). Therefore, anthropology texts have been used for the
understanding ofthe unique cultures in PNG, the concept of big men and the
distribution of social and political authority, as traditional ways are highly
relevant to current political, economic and social issues. Extended readings also
included history texts to further the understanding of how the cultures in PNG
were developed, the influence ofwestem systems through the years of
colonisation, and the merger of these influences with traditional ways in the
attempt to create the modem, independent state ofPNG. However, the focus is
necessarily on how these concepts explain the political dynamics ofPNG.

This thesis is presented in accordance with a linear-analytic structure which is a
standard approach for composing research projects and is recommended for theses
(Yin, 2003, pp. 152-153). This thesis is divided into this introduction, five
chapters, and a conclusion. The first chapter provides an examination of failed
state theory and how it is incorporated in the PSI together with the methodology
of the Index. This then provides the tool for the case study ofPNG9, starting with
an analysis in chapter two of how PNG received its rating by the Index. This
9

This is in accordance to the guidelines for research using a theory and a case study as presented
by Yin (2003, pp. 28, 32-33, 111-112).

8

analysis will bring to light any potential deficiencies and I or inaccuracies of the
Index. These will then be further examined by discussing some ofPNG's specific
political, economic and social issues in chapters three, four and five, with findings
and recommendations presented in the conclusion.

9

Chapter 1 - Failed State Theory and the Failed States Index

Failed state theory, like any theory in the social sciences, attempts to explain
reality. A theory is a "set of systematically related propositions", which functions
primarily to use facts in order to explain a phenomena and I or the relationship
between different phenomenon or concepts (Biesanz & Biesanz, 1973, p. 35).
According to Blumer (cited in Biesanz & Biesanz, 1973, p. 35), the aim of a
theory is "not to form scientific propositions but to outline and define life
situations so that people may have a clearer understanding of their world, its
possibilities of development, and the directions along which it may move". An
effective theory should allow a framework for interpreting data as well as purpose
and directions for research. Furthermore, it should be useful in identifying
similarities between different things, as well as differences between similar things
(Biesanz & Biesanz, 1973, p. 36).

It follows that a theory needs to be broad enough to be applicable to different facts

and concepts at the same time as it needs to be specific enough to have sufficient
explanatory power to be useful. A failed state theory should therefore identify
what constitutes failure and explain the phenomena of state failure by exploring a
range of data and identifying similarities and differences from cases of failing
states to show why and how they failed.

State failure can be defined as "the demise of the practical operation of
governmental functions for a particular territory of an internationally recognized
state" (Wallensteen, 1998, online). This can be manifested in several different
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ways, for example through the government's inability to control its borders and
territory and provide basic services to its citizens. States have failed ever since the
creation of the nation-state in the 1ih century, and post World War II the process
of de-colonisation and the end of the Cold War has seen a number of new states,
mainly in Africa and Asia, struggling to develop into well-functioning, stable
entities (Helman & Ratner, 1992, p. 3; Thiirer, 1999, online).

As a consequence, failed and failing states have become a topic for international
academic discourse. However there is still to emerge a general definition as to
what exactly constitutes a failed state and the causes behind state failure (Baker
cited in Fowler, 2006, online). This discourse has been loosely referred to as a
'theory' (Khor, cited in Lambach, 2006, p. 410). However, most experts discuss
failed states as a broad concept or phenomenon (Dunlap, 2004, online; Helman &
Ratner, 1992; Rotberg, 2003; Thiirer, 1999). Since President Bush declared the
'war on terror', the attention given to failed states shifted from being concerned
with humanitarian issues to international security issues (Dunlap, 2004, online;
Patrick, 2006a, p. 27), and, as a result, it has received increased attention.

Failed states emerged as one of the most important issues in international politics
after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. The
presence of failed states as a significant issue on the political agenda was
confirmed by the American President George W. Bush who claimed in the
National Security Strategy for 2002 that the US was now threatened more by
failing states than by conquering ones (Bush, 2002, online). Bush's sentiment was
echoed by the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (2002, online) who stated that
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"turning a blind eye to the breakdown of order in any part of the world, however
distant, invites direct threats·to our national security wellbeing ... preventing states
from failing and resuscitating those that fail is one of the strategic imperatives of
our times".

The importance of addressing the issue of failed and failing states has been further
stressed by several scholars, with Robert I. Rotberg (2003, p. 1) arguing that
nation-states are what constitute the foundation of legitimate world order and that
failing and failed states threaten this very system. Jeffrey Record (2000, online)
claims that failed states have become the "primary source of instability in the
international political system". Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual (2005,
p.153) agree, stating that weak and failed states acutely threaten global security
due to the world's increasing level of interconnectedness. This threat is identified
as taking the form of terrorism, illegal drug trade, weapon proliferation,
trafficking of illegal workers and other forms of organised crime (Krasner &
Pascual, 2005, p. 153; Mallaby, 2002, online).

However, failed and failing states should not only be regarded as an important
issue because they pose a threat to global security; indeed they also produce
horrific consequences for their own citizens. A report prepared by The African
Studies Centre in Leiden, the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam, The Center of
Social Studies at Coimbra University and The Peace Research Center- CIPFUHEM in Madrid states that a majority of the world's armed conflicts occur in
failing or collapsed states, and that they create situations where millions of people
are affected by death and social and economic destruction which further create a
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massive number of refugees and internally displaced people (The African Studies
Centre et al, 2003, online). ·

In spite ofthe increased attention being given to the issue of failed and failing
states, the topic of state failure is still under-researched (Rotberg, 2003, p. 2).
Therefore, there is yet to emerge a definitive and globally acknowledged
definition of what constitutes a failed or failing state and the 'theory' is still
developing. Daniel Thiirer (1999, p.732) argues that the term "failed", when
describing a state, serves as a "broad label of a phenomena" rather than denoting a
specific and clearly defined situation. There is still uncertainty about how to
define a failed or failing state and how widespread the problem is (The Failed
States Index, 2005b, online).

When attempting to define state failure, there needs to be an agreement on what
constitutes the functions of a state. According to Rotberg (2003, p. 2) "Nationstates exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public)
goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders)". It follows that
the success or failure of a state is directly dependent upon its ability to deliver
these political goods to its people, as agreed by Patrick (2006a, p. 29), and that by
studying the effectiveness of the state in this task, the observer can determine
whether the state is strong, weak, failed or collapsed (Rotberg, 2003, p. 2).

Rotberg argues that there exists a hierarchy of political goods (2003, p. 3). At the
top of this hierarchy is human security and according to political theory, the state
is irreplaceable in guaranteeing this security (Lambach, 2006, p. 208). Therefore,

13

the most important function of the state is to provide a secure environment in
which its citizens can live. For the state to be successful in this, it needs to protect
its sovereignty from outside intervention, ensure a secure domestic climate free
from attacks on the state's social structure and the national order, to prevent
crime, and to allow for its citizens to settle their disputes, whether it be with the
state or with fellow citizens, in a peaceful way (Rotberg, 2003, p. 3).

The next political good on the hierarchy is the opportunity for the citizens to
actively play a part in the political process ofthe state (Rotberg, 2003, p.3). This
political good can be referred to as the legitimacy ofthe state (Patrick, 2006a, p.
29). It includes the right to compete for political office, respect and support for
political institutions both on a national and regional level, as well as the provision
of civil and human rights (Rotberg, 2003, p. 3). Therefore, democracy is a
necessity if not always a guarantee of a strong and successful state.

Further down the hierarchy of political goods can be found healthcare, the
provision of education, physical and communicational infrastructure, and a
beneficial fiscal climate (including a money and banking system) in which the
citizens can pursue their economic interests (Patrick, 2006a, p. 29; Rotberg, 2003,
p.3-4). Furthermore, the state is also expected to supply methods of controlling
the sharing of environmental commons and to promote its civil society (Rotberg,
p. 4). Ifthese political goods are considered, roughly ranked in above mentioned
order, they provide a set of criteria by which the nature of a state can be
determined as being strong, weak, failed or collapsed (Rotberg, p. 4).
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Experts have also identified some key indicators, as opposed to criteria, of state
failure. These include widespread corruption, increased criminality and violence
(The African Studies Centre et al., 2003, p. 4), and declining real national and per
capita levels ofthe state's annual gross domestic product (GDP) (Rotberg, 2003,
pp. 6-8). If added to the set of criteria discussed above, these indicators can
provide useful information about the health of a nation and contribute to the
detection of a failing state.

In addition, Rotberg (2003, p. 9) explains how a nation-state can lose its
legitimacy. Once a state loses the capacity to provide its citizens with the expected
political goods, and if the small capacity the state retains is devoted to furthering
the interests of the ruling elite (or alternatively the ruling ethnic group), the
excluded citizens will not remain loyal to the state (Rotberg, 2003, p. 9). This can
lead to a situation where people transfer there allegiances and loyalty to the local
community and traditional cultural leaders become more powerful and influential
than state leaders (Rotberg, 2003, p. 9).

This situation is particularly important when analysing PNG as it has such high
levels of social fragmentation and allegiances to traditional leaders, such as a
clan's 'Big Men' 10, have remained strong. It would therefore seem that it is
especially important for the government in a country with this type of political
culture to have strong presence throughout its territory, and to make every effort
possible to ensure its population that it is devoted to furthering the interests of the
nation rather than those of individual politicians or small, specific groups.

10

See further discussion on big men in chapter 2.
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When discussing state failure, experts have introduced terms such as 'weak' and
'failing' states, referring to states that may share some ofthe characteristics of
failed states, but which are still functioning to various degrees. Furthermore, the
expression of 'collapsed state' has been used to describe a state that has gone
beyond being failed to such a degree that there is no recognisable government left
(The African Studies Centre et al., 2003, p. 2). Therefore it can be argued that
there is a continuum of state failure, moving from weak through failing and failed
to collapsed.

Although failed states are far from a new phenomenon in global politics, the
'theory' on failed states is relatively new and there is yet to emerge a definitive
agreement on its definitions and key criteria. Indeed, most experts do not refer to
the discussion on failed states as a theory but treat it as a broad, and currently
under-researched, concept (Rotberg, 2003, pp. 2-3). This poses the question of
whether failed state theory is specific enough to be useful when analysing the
functioning of a country. On the other hand; is the 'theory' broad enough to be
applicable to any given country? Does it have the flexibility to take unique
circumstances into consideration?

One recent attempt to use the ideas of failed state theory to provide specific
country assessments has been the FSI. Foreign Policy together with the Fund for

Peace developed this index in 2005, which had as its primary objective to
"present a more precise picture ofthe scope and the implications" ofthe problems
posed by failed and failing states (Failed States Index, 2005b, online). According
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to the Fund for Peace, the definition they use for a failing state is a state where the
government "is losing physical control of its territory or lacks a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force" (Failed States Index, 2005b, online). The Index provides a
global ranking of weak and failed states that are being updated on an annual basis.
It uses 12 specific indicators grouped along social, political and economic lines,
and by analysing an extensive amount of key data related to these 12 indicators
the rankings ofthe Index has been reached. The indicators are 11 :

Social indicators:

Mounting demographic pressure- Pressures deriving from high population
density, group settlement patterns and skewed population distributions.

Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex
humanitarian emergencies

Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of

random or targeted violence and/or repression.

A legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia -History of
aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, specific groups
singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or
repression and institutionalised political exclusion.

Chronic and sustained human flight- 'Brain drain' of professionals, intellectuals
and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression, the voluntary emigration

11

These are summaries of the indicators' definitions. See Appendix B for the complete definitions.
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of the middle class, such as entrepreneurs, business people, artisans and traders,
due to economic deterioration and the growth of exile communities.

Economic indicators:

Uneven economic development along group lines- Group-based inequality, or
perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status.

Sharp and I or severe economic decline- A pattern of progressive economic
decline ofthe society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt,
child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic
measures.

Political indicators:

Criminalisation and I or delegitimisation of the state- Massive and endemic
corruption or profiteering by ruling elites and widespread loss of popular
confidence in state institutions and processes.

Progressive deterioration ofpublic services- Disappearance ofbasic state
functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism
and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education,
sanitation and public transportation.

The suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread
violation of human rights - Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule
in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended
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or manipulated, outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence
against innocent civilians and widespread abuse of legal, political and social
rights.

Security apparatus operates as a 'state within a state' Emergence of elite or
praetorian guards that operate with impunity and emergence of an 'army within
an army' that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique.

The rise offactionalised elites -Fragmentation of ruling elites and state
institutions along group lines.

Intervention of other states or external political actors

Military or Para-military

engagement in the internal affairs of the state by outside armies, states, identity
groups or entities and intervention by donors, especially ifthere is a tendency
towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions (Failed States
Index, 2006h, online).

When analysing a country, these 12 indicators are each given a number on a scale
from 0-10, 10 being the worst, to produce a total for any assessed country. This
total then places the country on a list, the Index, where the country with the
highest total is the country assessed to be the 'most failed'. The 12 indicators are
currently equally weighted, meaning that the Index does not have the ability to
consider whether some indicators are of higher importance than others in a certain
country. According to the President of the Fund for Peace, Pauline Baker, the
reason why the indicators are of equal weighting is because of the lack of
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empirical analyses. The Index will seek to attach weight to the different indicators
in the future as more research is conducted (Baker cited in Fowler, 2006, online).

The ratings of the PSI were produced by the use of the Conflict Assessment
System Tool (CAST), which is a methodology developed by the Fund for Peace
and used for early warning and assessment of internal conflicts (Failed States
Index, 2006a, online). According to the PSI (2006a, online), CAST "incorporates
a theoretical rationale, a conceptual framework, quantitative and qualitative
indicators, indicator measures, and a rating system for trend analysis that can track
a conflict over time". CAST is furthermore described as a tool that can "identify
and anticipate failing states" (Failed States Index, 2006a, online), it has been peer
reviewed, refined and updated over the last decade, and has been used by the US
State Department, the Government of the Netherlands, the US Army
Peacekeeping Institute and the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(Failed States Index, 2006a, online).

The CAST methodology employs a four-step analysis (or five steps if the 'PreAssessment Steps' is counted), however only one step, the one incorporating the
use of the 12 indicators, is used for the FSI 12 . The use ofthe indicators is designed
to provide a snapshot of"state vulnerability or risk of violence during a window
in time" (Failed States Index, 2006d, online). The data used for each PSI has been
collected from May to December of the preceding year and consists of tens of
thousands of open-source reports and articles that have been scanned by the
CAST software. This software calculates how many positive and negative hits a

12

For a definition of all five steps see Appendix C.
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country receive on each of the indicators and this produces a score. The score is
then reviewed by experts together with relevant articles, when found necessary, to
ensure the accuracy of the score (Failed States Index, 2006d, online).

The FSI has been praised for "injecting some much-needed precision into the
catchall category of 'failed state"' (Patrick, 2006b, p. 7). However it has also
received various forms of criticism. In the 2006 Index, Pakistan ranked 9th above
countries such as Afghanistan (which was ranked 1oth), Liberia (11th) and Sierra
Leone (16th). This attracted strong criticism from the Embassy of Pakistan in
Washington referring to the PSI's ranking ofPakistan as "bizarre" (Shaheedi,
2006, pp. 6-7).

The PSI identified the massive earthquake of 2005 as the primary reason for
Pakistan's high ranking, contributing to the country scoring extremely high on the
social indicators of demographic pressures and refugees and displaced persons
(Failed States Index, 2006f, online; Shaheedi, 2006, p. 6). However, the Press
Minister ofthe Pakistani embassy, M. Akram Shaheedi (2006, pp. 6-7), argues
that the earthquake should have had the opposite effect on the Index's ranking of
Pakistan as it was followed by global acknowledgement ofthe well-organised
relief and rehabilitation efforts by the government and the Pakistani people.
Furthermore, Shaheedi pointed to Pakistan's growing economy and the
representation of women throughout the political system as factors showing that
the state of Pakistan should not be considered as being 'failed' (Shaheedi, 2006,
pp. 6-7).
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It may seem obvious that Pakistani state representatives should protest their

country's high ranking, but the criticism from M. Akram Shaheedi highlights a
potential problem of the FSI. It may be justified to rank Pakistan high on some of
the indicators affected by the earthquake but the Index seems to have been
insufficient in taking into account the excellent response of the government. This
suggests that the 12 indicators of the Index may not always be adequate when
evaluating the performance of a state.

The FSI has also been criticised by Charles T. Call, an Assistant Professor of the
School of International Service at the American University, Washington, D.C,
who described it as a "deeply flawed enterprise" and called for it to be abandoned
(Call, 2006, p. 9). Call argues that 'state failure' is a concept too broad to be
useful and that the Index's limitation to 12 indicators lead to an approach that
groups together countries that in reality are more different than alike (Call, 2006,
p. 9). This again points to the inadequacy of using the 12 specified indicators
when analysing the situation in a country and questions the usefulness ofthe
Index.

To examine the usefulness and also the shortcomings of the FSI, this thesis will
now explore its applicability and relevance to PNG. The next chapter will
determine how PNG has received its ranking by the Index as well as highlight
some potential problems with the Index's analysis ofPNG. These problems will
then be further explored through discussions on PNG's key political, economic
and social issues.
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Chapter 2 - PNG and the Failed States Index

PNG did not appear on the first FSI that was published in 2005 13 (Failed States
Index, 2005a). Therefore the FSI of2006, published in May, is the country's first
ranking. PNG received a total score of 84.6, equalling an average score of7.05 for
each ofthe 12 indicators, ranking it 49th in the Index (Failed States Index, 2006g,
online).

Table 1
Papua New Guinea's Index score
Indicator
Demographic Pressures

Category

Score

8.0

Social

Refugees and Displaced Persons

2.5

Indicators

Group Grievances

8.0

Human Flight

8.0

Economic

Uneven Development

9.0

Indicators

Economic Growth

7.0

Legitimacy of the State

7.8

Public Services

8.0

Political

Human Rights

6.1

Indicators

Security Apparatus

7.0

Factionalised Elites

6.7

External Influence

6.5

TOTAL

84.6

Source: Failed States Index, 2006g, online.
13

The 2005 Index only 1isted the countries ranked from number one to number 60 (Failed States
Index, 2005a, online).

23
(

This chapter will analyse how PNG received its FSI score. It will seek to
determine whether the scores for the different indicators are justified, and when a
score seems to be unjustified the cases of this possible inaccuracy will be
identified.

The Index attributed relatively high scores to PNG on all the social indicators
except for the refugees and displaced persons indicator as there are only a limited
number of refugees and internally displaced people living in PNG (Failed States
Index, 2006g, online). Of particular interest are the indicators of demographic
pressures and group grievances as these categories have the potential to
significantly impact on other areas in PNG.

The demographic pressure rated 8.0 because ofPNG's population growth rate of
2.21 %(Failed States Index, 2006g, online) 14 . The population growth is
particularly high in some of the highlands regions, which has led to an increased
number ofland disputes between different tribes (Failed States Index, 2006g,
online). The population ofPNG has nearly doubled, from being 2.9 million at
independence in 197{ to being 5.6 million in 2006 (The World Fact handbook,
2006, online). The average population growth over the last decade has remained
around a steady 2.5% 15 • This is a relatively high number which can be compared
to that of 0.85 % in Australia and 1.41 % in Indonesia. The age distribution is
heavily centred on children with 41 %of the population being under the age of 15

14

Some of the countries that rated higher than PNG were Congo, which rated 9.5 (Failed States
Index, 2006, online) with a population growth of 2.9% (UN, 2005, online) and Chad, which rated
9 (Failed States Index, 2006, online) with a population growth of2.8% (UN, 2005, online).
15
Figures on the average population growth varies between sources but is generally cited around
2.5%, see May, (2006, p. 152); Samana, (1988, p. 61); and The World Fact Book, (2006, online).
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(Morris & Stewmi, 2005, online). Therefore, the Index score of 8.0 appears to be
justified.

Similarly, group grievance was rated 8.0 largely because of widespread tribal
fighting in the highlands. The PSI (2006, online) claims that much of the tribal
fighting stems from the 2002 elections which saw politicians giving automatic
weapons to their clansmen and encouraging them to intimidate political rivals and
their supporters. Furthermore, the Index argues that tribes have taken up arms
because they no longer believe in the ability of their government to mediate their
disputes (Failed States Index, 2006g, online).

However, inter-tribal fighting is deeply rooted in the history and traditions of
PNG, and although the 2002 elections certainly contributed to an increase in the
fighting, the violence must be considered in the wider picture of on-going tribal
warfare. Additionally, group grievances is not only a highlands problem but has
become part of the gang culture of the 'raskols' 16 in some of the larger cities
(Ward, 2000). Therefore it could be considered that the justification of the score
of 8.0 may be inadequate in representing the wider problems caused by group
grievance and it follows that the score could be considered to be too low.

Human flight was rated 8.0 as the PSI claims that PNG has seen "a large number
of people" seeking "better opportunities" in Australia and other countries (Failed
States Index, 2006g, online). However, the relevance of this claim may be
questioned as 'brain-drain' is not generally cited as a problem in the literature on
16

Criminals often attached to a criminal gang dealing in petty crimes and crimes ofviolence.(May,
2006, p. 157).
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PNG, and there does not seem to be any reliable data that would prove that human
flight is indeed a significant-problem. The relatively high rating of 8.0 can
therefore be considered to be too pigh.

PNG scored a high 9. 0 for uneven development because of its extremely high
levels of inequality. According to the FSI (2006, online), the top 10% ofPNG's
population controls more than 40% of the income, with only 1.7% of the income
being controlled by the bottom 10% ofPapua New Guineans. Furthermore, there
is a clear division in wealth distribution between the urban and the rural areas with
94.3% of the poor living in rural PNG (Gibson & Rozelle, 2003, online). The
score of the Index corresponds well with PNG' s Gini ratio 17 of 51, which is the
highest in the Asia-Pacific region (AusAid, 2006, p. 53) and 9.0 can therefore be
considered an accurate score.

Economic growth received a score of7.0 due to the economy being stagnant with
the GDP growing at a rate only slightly higher than the population growth rate.
The last two decades has seen only a limited economic growth outside of the
mining sector, and PNG is experiencing problems in other areas, such as
infrastructure and education, which contributes to its weak economic performance
(Chand, 2003, p. 7; Faal, 2006, p. 18; Failed States Index, 2006g, online). It
follows that the score of7.0 seems to be fairly accurate in reflecting the current
situation. The FSI loosely mentions urban unemployment as being "said to be as

17

"The Gini ratio (or index of income concentration) is a statistical measure of income equality
ranging fi-om 0 to 1. A measure of 1 indicates perfect inequality; one person has all the income
and the rest have none. A measure ofO indicates perfect equality; all people have equal shares of
income" (US Census Bureau, 2004, online). The Gini ratio can be expressed as a percentage
between 1 and 100, i.e.' 0.51 becomes 51 which is PNG's rating.
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high as 80 %" (Failed States Index, 2006g, online), but its economic assessment
ofPNG does not seem to be based on any existing, accurate unemployment data.
Therefore, the assessment resulting in the 7.0 score can be argued to be
\

inconclusive.

The legitimacy ofstate indicator was rated 7.8 because of institutional corruption
and the lack of popular confidence in state institutions which has led to rising
levels of clan fighting (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). Corruption is widely
acknowledged as being a widespread problem in PNG (Garap, 2004, p. 2; Pitts,
2002; Reilly, 2002b, p. 323) and clan and tribe warfare is common. Therefore the
score of7.8 seems justified. However, PNG is experiencing other political issues
directly linked to the legitimacy of the state, such as border and territorial control,
which are not accounted for in this, or any other, indicator.

PNG scored 8.0 for its public services, which are particularly lacking in remote
areas. The chiefproblem is the lack of sufficient infrastructure 18 which then
contributes to the difficulty of providing basic public services such as education
and healthcare to many rural areas (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). According
to the FSI, the indicator of public services includes the protection of its citizens
from violence but, despite this, the massive problems of crime and violence facing
PNG is not mentioned in the Index's analysis of the public services in the country.
Furthermore, the lack in public services such as healthcare and education is not
linked to the larger social problem ofHIV/AIDS. This taken into consideration, it

18

For example, according to 1999 statistics, less than five percent of roadways in PNG were paved
(The World Fact Book, 2006, online).
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may be suggested that either the indicator, or its score of 8.0, is insufficient in
reflecting the real problems in PNG.

According to the FSI (2006, online), human rights in PNG were "generally
respected" but due to some instances of human rights abuse the country received a
score of 6.1 for this indicator. These incidents included the police firing into a
group of students, killing three and injuring at least 20 in October 2005 (Failed
States Index, 2006g, online). Furthermore, conditions in prisons were said to be
poor and police had been accused of mistreating suspects (Failed States Index,
2006g, online).

PNG scored 7.0 for the security apparatus indicator due to tribal militias engaging
in armed conflicts (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). The high level of tribal
warfare in PNG, and its links to politicians around election times, seems to justify
this score of 7.0, while the abstinence of an 'army within an army' and statesponsored militias acting on a national level kept the score from being higher 19 .
However, there have been incidents of violent protests within the army, not in
support ofleading politicians but rather to protect the army's own interests (Chin,
2002, p. 150; Denoon, 2005, p. 178), and if this is not covered in the security
apparatus indicator it may suggest that the indicator is too narrowly defined.

The factionalised elites indicator of 6. 7 was based on the national government
being dominated by local political loyalties, leading to unstable and constantly
changing coalition governments (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). The political

19

See full explanation of the security apparatus indicator in Appendix B.
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loyalties have often been divided along ethnic lines (Moore, 2003, p. 197) and the
domination of personal and -local political interests have hindered the development
of a national consciousness (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). Therefore, the
score of 6. 7 seems well justified. However, this indicator can be linked to wider
political problems in PNG; problems that have their roots in the traditional values
and the high level of social fragmentation.

Political and social authority has traditionally been held by persons referred to as
'big men'. According to a well recognised discussion on big men, written by
Marshall D. Sahlins (1963), the position and functioning of a political and social
leader in PNG (as being part of Melanesia) is significantly different from that of a
political and social leader in neighbouring societies in Polynesia20 (Sahlins, 1963,
pp. 203-204). The big man figure has its origins in Melanesia (Strathem, 1991, p.
1) and an understanding ofwhat it entails and how such a position is acquired is
essential to the understanding ofhow PNG functions.

Traditionally, a big man in PNG has achieved this status through his own actions.
The power of a big man is personal power; it rests with him as a person rather
than with the position21 (Sahlins, 1963, p. 206). As stated by Sahlins (1963, p.
206):
Big-men do not come to office; they do not succeed to ... existing
positions of leadership over political groups. The attainment ofbigman status is rather the outcome of a series of acts which elevate a

20

However, as Sahlins (1963, p. 204) points out, differences to Polynesia are the most notable in
western Melanesia, with societies located in eastern Melanesia being more similar to those in
Polynesia. He defines it as a west-to-east continuum.
21
This can be considered in contrast with a position such as a king or a president, where the power
rests with the position and will be transferred between anyone who holds the position. The power
of a big man is not transferable to another big man should the first big man die (or for some other
reason cease being a big man).
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person above the common herd and attract about him a coterie of
loyal, lesser men.

The deference shown a big man is an acknowledgement from the people. A rising
big man is dependent on a core of followers, often his family and other close
relatives. He will need to show that he possesses skills that command respect,
such as magical powers, the mastery of oratorical style and the ability to build
wealth (Sahlins, 1963, pp. 206-208). If he is successful, the number of people who
follow him will increase and spread beyond family and relatives. The big man's
authority grows with the number of his followers, but it continues to be dependent
on personal relationships and loyalty. He can decide on the course of action and
he dominates events in accordance with the scope ofhis relationships and wealth
(Lemonnier, 1991, p. 10). The big man needs to constantly reinforce the loyalty
of these relationships through his personal actions. Ifthe people who acknowledge
him as a big man are dissatisfied they can sever their links to the big man, remove
their support, and as a result a big man can cease being a big man (Sahlins, 1963,
pp. 206-208).

Sahlins' essay has received some criticism, for example from scholars pointing to
the existence of other forms of social and political leadership in PNG. John Liep
(1991, pp. 28-29) argues that there are tendencies in PNG for hereditary
succession to big man status which would suggest that the position of a big man is
not acquired solely through his personal actions. Indeed, the Mekeo people in the
south-east ofPNG have the hereditary positions of 'chie:f and 'sorcerer' which,
according to Mosko, are similar to positions of power in Polynesia (1991, p. 97).
It has been argued that there are significant differences between ethnic and social
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groups in PNG (Lederman, 1991, p. 216; Lemonnier, 1991, p. 7) and therefore
Sahlins discussion may be seen as too simplistic. However, it is still useful to
accept a certain degree of generalisation of the big man concept, as Sahlins
broader definitions apply to a number of social groups in PNG, in order to
understand the current political, economic and social structure.

The influence ofbig men and the focus of power in individuals rather than
political parties have led to a fragmented party system, weak coalition
governments and a political climate where every government to date has failed to
serve a full term (May, 2004, p. 4). These problems undermine democratic
legitimacy and it can be argued that the indicator score of 6. 7 therefore fails to
cover the extent of the factionalised elites problem in an accurate way.

The final indicator, external influence, had PNG scoring 6.5 because of its close
ties with Australia. The FSI explains this rating by pointing to the Enhanced
Cooperation Program (ECP) of June 200422 , which was later suspended in May
2005, and by referring to the "close involvement of Australia in Papua New
Guinea's internal affairs" (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). However, using the
ECP as an example of justification for the score seems inconsistent with the
methodology ofthe Index as each year's rankings are allegedly based on data
collected from "May to December of the preceding year" (Failed States Index,
2006d, online).

22

The Enhanced Cooperation Program was designed to help address PNG's development
challenges in the areas oflaw and order, justice, economic management, public sector reform,
border control and transport security and safety. The program was agreed upon in December 2003,
and a treaty was signed by the Australian and PNG governments in June 2004 (Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006c, online).
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The FSI also points to PNG'·s dependence on Australian aid which accounted for
20% ofPNG's budget (Failed States Index, 2006g, online; The World Fact Book,
2006, online). Indeed, this seems justified as the definition of the external
influence indicator includes the "tendency towards over-dependence on foreign
aid" (Failed States Index, 2006h, online). However, it can be suggested that it is
insufficient to consider PNG' s dependence on foreign aid as a solely political
problem without linking it to the economic situation in the country.

Having analysed how PNG received its FSI score, it is obvious that this lack of
linking between different indicators, within and across the three categories (social,
economic and political), is one of the Index's shortcomings. The economic
problems in PNG are clearly linked to its high rate of population growth, falling
under the social indicator of demographic pressure, and the external influence
problem of Australia's involvement in PNG politics is largely due to the aid
program, therefore linking it to economic issues.

The FSI also fails in recognising the wider problems caused by issues discussed
under the indicators of group grievance and the security apparatus, suggesting that
these indicators are too narrowly defined. However, these short-comings could be
caused by the lack of accessible information on how the Index justifies its scores,
and may have been taken into consideration without it being noticed in the
literature. If this is the case, criticism should then rather be directed at the amount
of information made available by the Index as to how they calculated their scores.
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There are also some clear issues in PNG not covered by the Index, which
contribute significantly to the stability and well-functioning of the country. These
issues include lack of control over borders and territory, problems posed by a
HIV/AIDS 23 epidemic, and crime and violenceproblems related to a deteriorating
law and order situation. Law and order is indeed covered by some of the Index
indicators, however, the issues of crime and violence in PNG are so severe they
need to be discussed as a separate issue that can then be related to other areas.
Furthermore, the indicators do not include an analysis of unemployment figures 24 ,
which can be argued to be an important economic and social indicator for a
country. Therefore, an insufficient number of indicators is another of the Index's
shortcomings.

The methodology used in the FSI adds to its overall deficiencies. The time frame
for the research, as specified in the methodology, seems to have been
inconsistently used when considering the Index's justification for the external
influence score. However, the use of information collected outside of the research
window may well be justified. For example, it will be argued that the history of
the Bougainville conflict is still influencing the stability in PNG and should
therefore be considered when analysing the country. This poses the question of
whether the use of a research window is insufficient for an accurate evaluation, as
events that have taken place before the time frame of the research window can be
crucial to the understanding of current issues.

23

According to the Failed States Index (2006b, online), HIV/AIDS is a "sub-indictor" but it does
not state which indicator it is related to and is not further referred to in the discussion on PNG.
24
The Failed States Index (2006g, online) refers to an unemployment figure of 80% for urban
areas but does not discuss the problem further.
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An attempt, such as the PSI, ·to assess countries based on a specific set of
indicators will always receive criticisms. As observers will approach such an
attempt in different ways there will always be the issue of whether the 'right'
indicators are being used; the 'important' problems discussed. Different observers
will inevitably have different opinions. This thesis will now examine issues in
PNG that highlight the shortcomings of the Index as identified in this chapter.
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Chapter 3 - The Failed States Index and the Political situation in PNG

Since 1974, the number of democracies worldwide has quadrupled to incorporate
120 nations (Koh, 2000, online). However, the extent to which all these nations
abide by the core principles of democracy is open to debate. According to Rotberg
(2003, p. 3), a state is required to enable its citizens to "participate freely, openly,
and fully in politics" and that democratic states have the ability to respond to
popular discontent as well as a political system that accommodates challenges
from dissident political groups. Additionally, a democracy can protect its citizens
against massive human rights abuse. Therefore, democracies "fail to fail"
(Rotberg, 2003, pp. 20-21).

Democracy has been prevalent in PNG since independence in 1975 and, according
to Myron Weiner in 1987 (cited in Reilly, 2000, pp. 171-172), this put PNG in a
group of only six developing nations with a population of more than one million
that had remained democratic since its independence25 . More recently, PNG was
classified by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset as a stable
democracy together with only four other developing countries26 (cited in Reilly,
2000, p. 172).

This survival of a democratic political system in PNG may seem somewhat
surprising considering that a high level of social fragmentation has been cited by
several scholars as undermining democratic stability (Reilly, 2000, pp. 162-163).

25

The other five countries cited by Weiner were India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Jamaica and Trinidad
and Tobago (Reilly, 2000, pp. 171-172).
26
The other four countries cited by Diamond, Linz and Lipset were Venezuela, Costa Rica, India
and Botswana (Reilly, 2000, p. 172).
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However, the unique political culture, which is interconnected with the social
fragmentation in PNG, has a clear effect on how the democratic institutions are
allowed to function and democracy does not necessarily mean that PNG will 'fail
to fail'.

PNG is experiencing severe problems linked to the legitimacy of the state as well
as internal and external security issues. This chapter will discuss these problems
and analyse how they reflect on the usefulness of the FSI. It will show that there
are shortcomings in the way the Index's indicators present the political situation in
PNG and that there are clearly political problems that the Index does not account
for. To be able to analyse the political situation in PNG, its unique cultural climate
(or, indeed, number of cultural climates) must be considered.

Due to its high levels of social fragmentation, PNG has faced a continuous
problem of creating a feeling of nationhood among its citizens. The country is
now thirty years on from its independence and this problem still persists. Many
Papua New Guineans still place their loyalties and allegiances with the local
community before the state (May, 2006, p. 152). Apart from having roots in
cultural tradition, this problem is also the by product of natural causes, such as the
lack of interconnection due to the dramatic geographical terrain. Shortcomings by
the state in providing sufficient infrastructure have further hampered its ability to
establish its presence across remote areas of the nation.
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According to May (2006, p. 161), the public services in PNG have seen an
increased level of politicisation over the two previous decades, which has
contributed to factions of the population disengaging from the state and a
widespread corresponding attitude that the state has little legitimacy. This has led
to situations, especially in the highlands, where local community big men have a
significantly higher level of influence over the locals, than have the elected state
political representatives.

This form of political culture is further sustained by the characteristics of the party
system in PNG. It is a weak system where the parties are differentiated mainly by
their place of origin instead of political ideologies (Moore, 2003, p. 197). Rather
than voting for a candidate of a specific party, the majority of Papua New
Guineans let personality determine their vote; they vote for someone from their
own clan or tribe, or a person advised by their clan leader, as their social loyalty is
significantly stronger than their political loyalty (May, 2006, p. 164; Reilly, 2000,
p. 170). As a consequence, although citizens have the opportunity to participate in
the political process by voting, they strengthen their bonds with local leaders and
become more alienated from state leaders whom they see as having little or no
connection to their own community.

The nature of the first-past-the-post electoral system27 results in a high number of
candidates contesting each seat in parliament, which leads to a high turnover of
MPs from one election to another. According to May (2006, p. 164), the typical
percentage of turnover in all elections since independence has been between 50
27
As opposed to a preferential voting system. PNG has passed legislation to move from first-pastthe-post to optional preferential voting, and the new electoral system will be used for the first time
in next year's national elections.
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and 55 %. This high level turnover means that it has been difficult for successive
governments to maintain any long-term national policies. Whatever is good for
individual MPs on a short-term basis receives more attention than issues
important to the long-term national good ofPNG (May, 2006, p. 164) and this has
played a part in PNG failing to develop into a strong, modem nation.

These problems, which can be typified as a clash between political culture and
democratic ideals, are not recognised as such by the PSI. However, they cannot be
ignored when analysing the political problems of the legitimacy of the state and
the control of its borders and territory.

The PSI (2005, online) identified criminalisation and I or delegitimisation of the
state as an indication of state failure and that this can be characterised by
widespread corruption of the ruling elites. Corruption has been acknowledged to
be a large problem in PNG by several scholars (Denoon, 2005, pp. 172-177; Pitts,
2002; Reilly, 2002b, p. 323). A number ofPNG governments and individual
governmental officials have been under scrutiny for being corrupt, and this is
another significant reason why the country has seen such frequent change in
government since independence. To exemplify the country's political volatility:
an elected government has yet to serve out a full term as every government to date
has been replaced at least once on the floor of the parliament through the use of a
no-confidence vote 28 (Dorney, 1990, p. 53; May, 2006, p. 164; Reilly, 2000, p.
180).

28

A motion of no-confidence can be directed against the "Prime Minister, the Ministry or a
Minister, as the case may be", it needs to give "not less than one week's notice" and be "signed by
a number of members cif the Parliament being not less than one-tenth of the total number of seats
in the Parliament" (PNG Constitution, s 145:1a, s 145:lb). In the constitution a newly elected
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This use of the no-confidence vote and frequent change of government has led to
the functioning of the executive, as well as the legislative branches of
government, being compromised as politicians have become more focused on
their own political survival rather than on what is best for the nation (May, 2006,
p. 164; Reilly, 1999, pp. 233-234). For example, Prime Minister Bill Skate who
had come to power after the 1997 election used the tactic of adjourning the
parliament to escape a no-confidence vote.

In 1998, Skate was accused of bribery but was cleared of the allegations due to a
lack of"concrete evidence" (Wesley-Smith, 1999, p. 439). Skate then accused his
former Deputy Prime Minister, Chris Haiveta, of involvement in the bribery
accusations and of conspiring in an attempt to discredit Skate and his government.
As a consequence, Haiveta's party, the Pangu Pati, was dropped from the
coalition government and the reshuffling of posts that followed left many
parliamentarians dissatisfied as they lost influence and power. After having failed
to introduce changes to the constitution, designed to make it much more difficult
to remove the elected Prime Minister, Skate faced the possibility of a noconfidence vote against him (Wesley-Smith, 1999, p. 439). Once his 'safe-period'
was over he therefore chose to adjourn Parliament for eight months to avoid such
a vote and, hopefully, to rally support among the MPs 29 •

government was granted a 'safe-period' of six months from the date they were installed, during
which no vote of no-confidence could be proposed. Likewise, a vote of no-confidence can not be
used against a government during its final year leading up to an election. In 1991, in an attempt to
create a more stable working environment for a new government, the 'safe-period' after an
election was extended to 18 months, leaving a period of two and a half years in the middle of a
term when a governmeht can face a no-confidence vote (Saffu, 1998, p. 504).
29
Skate eventually lost office in July, 1999 (May, 2004, p. 6).
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Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta used similar tactics to avoid a no-confidence
vote the year after Skate (Chin, 2002, p. 150). In late 1999, he adjourned
parliament until July 2001 when his 12 months safe-period leading up to the 2002
elections was due to begin. Chin (2002, p. 150) argues that as a result of
Morauta's actions, much ofthe national politics in PNG during the first half of
2001 was focused on trying to get the Prime Minister to recall parliament,
however Morauta held out. These two examples show how both the stability and
the functionality of the PNG government are undermined when a political tool
ultimately designed to ensure the nation's democracy- the no-confidence vote in
combination with a fractured party system - is used by a politician in order for
him to protect himself30 .

In addition to political instability, the legitimacy ofPNG as a state is undermined
by problems in maintaining both internal and external security; an issue that the
FSI fails to deal with directly. Although PNG has been largely free from the threat
of outside intervention, it has seen security breeches along its borders as well as
severe domestic challenges.

PNG has experienced some trouble along its western border with the Indonesian
province of Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya). As Papua has long hosted a
separatist movement (the Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM, translated to the Free
Papua Movement) seeking the province's independence from Indonesia, PNG has
at times served as a haven for Papuan separatists fleeing Indonesian authorities.
As a consequence, PNG has been,accused by its neighbours of actively aiding the
30

Gelu (2006, pp. 413-414) argues that adjourning parliament to avoid a no-confidence vote has
become "the norm in Papua New Guinea politics" and discusses similar tactics used by the current
PM, Michael Somare.
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OPM and this has caused strains in the PNG-Indonesian relationship (May, 2006,
p. 155).

The PNG- Papuan border has also been the recent focus of criticism from Papua
New Guineans questioning border security. The PNG Defence Force commander
Commodore Peter Ilau confirmed that there had been a lapse in security at the
Wutung post and the Skou post in West Sepik between 5.10 pm and 7.30 am from
the 101h to the 11th of July, 2006 ("Security Concerns", 2006, online). He
expressed his concerns about the main access route in at the Wutung post not
being manned after-hours, stating that "from about 5.10 in the afternoon to 7.30 in
the morning we do not know what or who is or who has illegally crossed into our
country" (Ilau cited in "Security Concerns", 2006, online). The problems with the
manning of the border posts was explained by Commodore Ilau as being caused
by inadequate resources; the Wutung post having only five police officers
available. "There is no 24-hour, seven-days-a-week security at our main border
post" said Ilau, referring to the problem as a "key issue" in "times of scarce
resources" (Ilau cited in "Security Concerns", 2006, online).

The security on the border with Papua was also criticised by retired MajorGeneral and former commander of the PNGDF, Jerry Singirok, who claimed that
it posed a grave threat to Australia ("Australia warned", 2006, online). Singirok
argued that due to Canberra's push to cut the PNGDF, influencing a downsizing
of the force from more than 5,000 to no more than 2,000 troops, border security
was being "severely compromised" ("Australia warned", 2006, online). He further
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stated that there were few or no troops in place to patrol the border, leaving it
exposed to "illegal and suspicious migrants" ("Australia warned", 2006, online).

The lack of adequate security on the border has led to claims that the Indonesian
terrorist group Jemaah Islamiah has relatively easy access to PNG where they
could then attack Australian mining and energy interests:
Any terrorist with intention (to do harm) would obviously strike where
there's no defence, no security systems in place ... [i]f they cannot hit
Australia on its home soil, they're going to hit Australia where it
hurts ... [t]here's billions of dollars of Australian investment in PNG
and there's a relatively significant population of Australians (Singirok,
cited in "Australia warned", 2006).

Singirok referred to the downsizing ofthe PNG Defence Force as being
"humiliating" and a "security blunder" and that it compromised regional security
(Singirok, cited in "Australia warned", 2006).

The PNG government not only experiences problems in controlling its borders,
but it also faces severe domestic security i~sues. Claxton (2000, p. 263) identified
"

three key internal security challenges facing the country as being crime, tribal
fighting and separatism31 . The most severe separatist movement, leading to civil
war, was that on the island ofBougainville.

The violent conflict in Bougainville was ended by a permanent cease-fire in 1998,
however, issues regarding the political status of the Bougainville province have
yet to be resolved. In addition, the conflict has had a significant impact on the

31

The surging violence in both cities and the remote areas of the highlands will be further
discussed in chapter 6 as being part of social issues.

42

political and economic situation in the country and therefore it is relevant to any
analysis of current political -issues.

The Bougainville conflict was centred on the Panguna copper mine; however the
mine has been argued to have been a catalyst for the conflict rather then its cause
(Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1999, p. 13).

The conflict was the consequence of a number of pre-existing issues which are all
inter-related:
In the complex political, economic and cultural situation of
Bougainville, it is na'ive and misleading to attempt to analyse the
origins of the conflict in terms of single causes .... Each factor tended
to reinforce the importance of other factors at different times (Regan
quoted in Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade, 1999, p. 14).

Regan (1998, pp. 272-276) identifies increased economic inequality in
Bougainville after the Second World War as detrimental to the economic and
social climate in which the Panguna mine was opened in 1969. The mine was
controfled and operated by the Bougainville Mining Company (later Bougainville
Copper Ltd., BCL) which was a subsidiary of the Australian mining company
CRA (Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Ltd), and the PNG government (Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1999, p. 13; Turner,
2001, p. 27). Concern arose among some Bougainvilleans that they did not
receive their fair share of the profits from the mine (Turner, 2001, p. 27), and that
local land rights were not respected by BCL and the PNG government (Regan,
1998, pp. 274-275). Their concern may seem justified considering that the PNG
government received more than $1 billion in the period up until the closure ofthe
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mine, compared to the $33 million having been paid to the landowners (Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1999, pp. 17-18).

As a result of the local opposition to the Panguna copper mine, the New Panguna
Landowners Association (NPLA) was formed in the 1980s under the leadership of
Francis Ona. In April1988, the NPLA demanded a 50% share in BCL profits,
that the BCL ownership be localised within five years, as well as greater
environmental control and hefty compensation for profits made by the BCL (Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999, p. 21; Turner, 2001, p.
28). When these demands were not met, the armed faction ofthe NPLA, the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), started a wave of sabotage and
terrorism on the mine and forced its closure in May 1989 (Turner, 2001, pp. 2829).

The actions of the BRA prompted the PNG government to declare a state of
emergency in Bougainville in June 1989, and 2,000 soldiers and armed riot police
were sent in (Turner, 2001, p. 29). After nine months of fighting between the
BRA and the PNG security forces, the government withdrew its forces in March
1990 and replaced its armed presence with an economic and communications
blockade on Bougainville. The BRA then announced that their province (then
named the North Solomons Province) had seceded from PNG, and Ona declared it
to be the independent Republic ofMe'ekamui (Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999, p. 23). This action was declared unconstitutional
by the PNG government, and negotiations between Bougainville and PNG
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representatives followed, however they were all unsuccessful (Turner, 2001, p.
29).

The PNGDF was slowly returned to Bougainville over the next few years, and
basic government services followed. However, the blockade was effectively in
place until 1994 and some parts of Bougainville did not see a return of
government administration and services until after the peace process had begun in
1997 (Regan, 2005, p. 443). Meanwhile, the fighting continued between the BRA
and the PNGDF, escalating further during 1995 and 1996, seeing the assassination
of the elected premier ofBougainville, Theodore Miriung, in October, 1995
(O'Callaghan, 1999, p. 28; Turner, 2001, p. 30).

In 1997, the PNG Prime Minister Julius Chan, supported by his Defence Minister

Mathias Ijape and Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta, hired mercenaries in an
attempt to defeat the Bougainville rebellion (Joint Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs and Trade, 1999, pp. 29-39; Turner, 2001, pp. 28, 30). However, the
operation was abandoned after the Commander of the PNGDF, Brigadier General
Jerry Singirok turned against his prime minister and took action to remove the
mercenaries as he felt that there could be no military solution to the Bougainville
problem and he also considered the mercenary contract to be economically
unsustainable and referred to it as "suicide for PNG" (Singirok, cited in
O'Callaghan, 1999, pp. 40-41).
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Chan, Haiveta and Ijape were forced to stand down over this incident which
became known as the Sandline affair. According to the Joint Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999, p. 39), the collapse ofthe Sandline contract
ended the option of a military solution and instead paved the way for a peaceful
end to the Bougainville rebellion.

After the permanent cease-fire agreement in April1998 the Bougainville Peace
Process continued to move forward, with the Bougainville Peace Agreement being
signed in August 2001. This agreement provided for elections for the
establishment of autonomous government, as well as for a referendum on
Bougainvillean independence to be held in 10 to 15 years (Department ofForeign
Affairs and Trade, 2006, online).

Elections for the autonomous government were successfully held in 2005
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,

resulting in the first Bougainville President, former rebel leader Joseph Kabui,
together with 39 members of the Autonomous Bougainville Government being
sworn into office (Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade, 2006, online).
Although the civil war in the Bougainville province has ended, the issue of
Bougainville still poses problems for the PNG government. Not only has it lost
the revenue of the Panguna copper mine, but the successful uprising of locals
protesting against the mine could be argued as being inspirational to other Papua
New Guineans living around areas which are being exploited for their natural
resources.

32

According to Gelu (2006, p. 417), the election was "peaceful", "well prepared" and "well
conducted".

46

For example, on the

1st

of August, 2006, a state of emergency was declared in the

province ofthe Southern Highlands ("Threats to Shut Project", 2006, online). The
government justified the decision by stating that the law and order situation in the
province was fast deteriorating with a recent surge in local violence, threatening
gas and mining in the area. The governor of the Southern highlands was extremely
unhappy with the situation, threatening to shut down a gas-pipe project with
Queensland and calling for PM Somare's resignation ("Threats to Shut Project",
2006, online). This shows how locals can work their influence in a way which is
compromising the legitimacy of the state and with the potential of causing future
large-scale problems.

The security issues connected with the lack of governmental control over its
borders and territory are severe enough to be considered as having an influence on
PNG' s stability and performance as a state. However, they are not directly
covered by any of the indicators of the FSI, therefore highlighting shortcomings in
the Index's ability to rate political issues in PNG. Furthermore, the Index's
indicators are too specific, and its window·ofresearch too narrow, to sufficiently
consider the problems posed by the political culture in PNG.

The issue of Bougainville serves as criticism of the research window as it seems
insufficient to analyse a country based on data collected during such a limited
time period. It is clear that past events can still have an effect on current events,
and therefore, the Index should have the capacity to take into consideration a
country's past when assessing its current situation. An assessment based solely on
data collected during the year before could prove to be lacking in historical
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context and, therefore, the severity of current problems run the risk of being
understated.
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Chapter 4 - The Failed States Index and the Economic situation in
PNG

PNG scored extremely high (9.0) on the FSI indicator of uneven development, and
relatively high (7.0) on the indicator for economic growth. The Index therefore
suggests that PNG faces severe economic problems, but that the primary problem
lies in the area of distribution of development and wealth rather than in the
economy itself. However, this is not necessarily the case as the country's
economic growth is insufficient to accommodate the high rate of population
growth, hitting the already poor in the rural sector particularly hard. The indicator
for economic growth's rating of7.0 seems to be too low and it needs to be linked
to the one of uneven development to allow for a more accurate analysis.
Furthermore, the Index does not consider the specific problems ofPNG's
economic dependency on aid from Australia and other donors and therefore, the
Index's assessment of the PNG economy is only partly accurate.

According to Gibson and Rozelle (2003, online), PNG is very rich in natural
resources; however it has a Gini ratio that is one of the highest in the world
(Gibson & Rozelle, 2003, online). This means that the wealth ofthe country is
unevenly distributed with a significant gap between the rich and the poor.

Eighty five percent ofPNG's population lives in rural areas and they are heavily
reliant on their capability to grow their own food and other cash crops that provide
them with money used to cover some of their education and health costs (Morris
& Stewart, 2005, online). PNG has seen an increase in the number of people
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living below the national poverty line, with an estimation of 54 % of the
population living below the line in 2003 compared to 37.5% in 1996 (Morris &
Stewart, 2005, online). If the level of poverty is measured using the international
standard of poverty as being less than US$1 per day, the corresponding figures
would be roughly a rise from 25% to 40% (Morris & Stewart, 2005, online). The
poverty in PNG has been identified as mainly caused by: weak governance; weak
social support systems; inefficient use of natural resources; lack of economic and
financial growth opportunities; a poorly maintained infrastructure network; and
the inefficient delivery of, and lack of access to, basic services (Morris & Stewart,
2005, online).

PNG has a dual economy, consisting of the formal, corporate based economy, and
the informal economy largely based on subsistence farming (Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006b, online, 2006, online). The formal sector
employs a minority of the population within the mineral industry, the public
sector, and the service industries of finance, construction, transportation and
utilities. The informal sector employs a large number of the population as it is the
main employer in the rural areas (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
2006b, online). The last decade has seen a trend of migration of people from the
rural areas and the informal sector, to the main cities and an opportunity to work
in the formal sector. However this has contributed to unemployment problems
causing further social problems in the cities (Department ofForeign Affairs and
Trade, 2006b, online; May, 2006, p. 152).
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The Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea reported the unemployment rate for
the year 2000 as being 2.8% (Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea, 2006,
online). However, due to a large percentage of the population being employed in
the informal sector together with a lack of reliable up-to-date data, the
unemployment rate is likely to be much higher. For example, the unemployment
figure for young men in urban areas has been estimated at 40% (AusAID, 2006, p.
53, online). BBC correspondent Nick Squires (2004, online) cites the
unemployment figure for Port Moresby as being as high as 70%, while Maxine
Pitts (2002, p. 36) states that the number was 60% in 2001. According to the
Index, unemployment in some urban areas is said to be as high as 80 % (FSI,
2006, online). Furthermore, unemployment figures are continuously rising and
PNG also has a high level of people who are underemployed (AusAID, 2006, p.
53).

PNG's real national levels ofthe Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 33 have decreased
by nearly 50% since independence, and recent years have continued to show a
negative economic trend (Faal, 2006, online). Due to strong performances in the
sectors of mining and petroleum, the economy grew quite rapidly between 1991
and 1994. However, after 1994 the economy slowed down and high inflation
combined with a rapid population increase to produce a fall in per capita incomes
by an estimated 18% between 1994 and 2002 (Morris & Stewart, 2005, online).
The GDP per capita declined at an annual average rate of 1.4% from 1992 to
2002 (Chand, 2003, p. 7).

33

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the total value of goods and services produced in a country.
Real GDP is GDP adjusted for inflation, providing the GDP value in constant dollars (Federal
Reserve Bank ofMinneapolis, 2004, online).
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The last couple of years have seen some signs of an economic recovery with real
annual GDP expanding by roughly 3 % and the non-mineral GDP figures rising
an estimated 3.5% (IMF Mission Team, 2006, online). These positive numbers
have been the result of strong global commodity prices and the success of the
Papua New Guinean government in maintaining disciplined fiscal policies with a
well balanced budget (World Bank, 2006, online; Morris & Stewart, 2005,
online). However, as the rapid population growth is expected to continue, an
economy growing at about 3 % each year will not be enough to ensure a sufficient
increase in per capita income over the medium term and therefore, PNG is still
facing serious economic problems (Morris & Stewart, 2005, online).

Table 2
GOP per capita 1999 - 2003

1999 2000 2001
GDP per capita (US$)

686

664

553

2002 2003
512

566

Source: Morris & Stewart, 2005, online.
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Figure 1. Real GOP growth in% 2001 -2005
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At the time of its independence, PNG and Australia were hopeful that PNG would
develop into a modem, capitalist economy. However, PNG has been unable to
develop a self-reliant economy and has therefore remained dependent on foreign
aid from Australia.

Currently, PNG is receiving A$300 million in annual aid from Australia (Morris
and Stewart, 2005, online). The aid program has four key priorities as identified
by Morris and Stewart (2005, online): fostering sustainable development
(transport infrastructure and renewable resources); building stronger governance;
developing institutional capacity (governance, law and order, health and
education), and addressing HIV/AIDS.

In an attempt to make Australian aid more effective, the focus and the character of
the aid has been gradually changed over the last decade from having its emphasis
on budget aid to now being focused on program aid. Prior to the change,
Australian aid was given straight to the PNG government, allowing it relative
freedom in how the money was being used. The policy was changed in the late
1980s to provide for a greater transparency in how aid is being used, as program
focused aid can be more closely monitored (AusAID, 2003, p. 25). Program
focused aid means that the money contributed to PNG is intended for certain
programs and will be distributed in accordance with the guidelines of these
programs. The government ofPNG has therefore lost some of its control over how
the money is being spent. However, the revised system of aid has allowed
observers to better track its effectiveness.
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The way in which Australia's aid contribution to PNG is used has been questioned
in some circles with allegations that the money is wasted due to ineffectiveness
and corruption (May, 2006, p. 167). Windybank and Manning argues that
Australia's generous aid contribution has allowed successive PNG governments to
"live beyond their means, encouraging irresponsible policies and postponing the
need for reform" (Windybank and Manning, 2004, p. 12). However, the
withdrawal of Australian aid is not seen as an option because Australia has a
moral responsibility from having been PNG' s Colonial master. The aid is equally
important for security reasons as Australian aid has been recognised by successive
Canberra administrations as being essential to PNG's ability to satisfy the basic
needs of its citizens and maintain law and order (May, 2006, p. 167).

Although the PNG economy has shown some positive signs in recent years, the
economic issues facing the nation are still severe and the economic performance
will need to dramatically improve to ensure that PNG copes with its high rate of
population growth. Therefore, the possibility exists that the FSI score of7.0 is not
accurate as it fails to adequately consider the integration of a range of issues
undermining the fragility ofPNG's economy. Furthermore, the Index's economic
indicators are too narrowly defined; alternatively, it needs to link its economic
indicators to the political indicator of external influence, to properly incorporate
the influence ofPNG's dependency on foreign aid on its economic situation.
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Chapter 5- The Failed States Index and the Social situation in PNG

As a developing country with a limited economic base, securing a livelihood
remains a challenge for most ofPNG's population. ill fact, according to Morris
and Stewart (2005, online), PNG has the Pacific's worst social indicators, and its
human development indicator has remained poor in relation to its per capita
income. The UN publishes an index to measure human development and in the
latest Human Development fudex, which was based on 2003 statistics, PNG
ranked 13 7th out of 177 countries, and the trend over the last few years has been
negative (UN, 2005, online). Human development in PNG is lower than in any of
its neighbouring countries included in the fudex, and it rates PNG below several
African nations.

Table 3
Socia/ Indicators for Selected Pacific Nations
Country

Fiji
Nauru
PNG
Solomon
Islands
Tonga
Vanuatu

Gross
enrolment
ratio 38

Infant
mortality
per 1000
birthi4
18.0
10.3
61.0

Life
expectancy
at birth 35

Population
growth
rate36

Adult
literacy

69.3
62.0
57.4

0.7
2.4
2.7

93.2
95.0
64.6

81.3
79.5
28.6

20.0

68.7

3.4

76.6

37.7

13.3
34.0

68.6
68.3

0.3
2.7

99.0
34.0

83.3
57.4

%37

Source: Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 7.
34

2002 or latest data (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 7).
2002 or latest data (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 7).
36
Annual average for 2002 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 7).
37
For ages 15 and above, 2002 or latest data (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p.
7).
38
Combined ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment in 1998 (Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 7).
35
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Table 4
Socia/ Indicators for Selected South East Asian Nations and PNG
Adult
literacy

Indonesia
Malaysia

Life
expectancy
at birtlt 39
66.8
73.2

PNG
Singapore

55.3
78.7

Country

GDPper
capita

87.9
88.7

Gross
enrolment
41
Ratio %
66
71

57.3
92.5

41
87

2,619
24,481

%40

(US$/2
3,361
9,512

Source: UN Human Development Index, 2005, online.

PNG is currently facing two social problems that are particularly pressing, neither
of which is represented by an indicator in the FSI: crime and violence and
HIV/AIDS.

Serious crime in PNG has increased by four percent a year since 1990, and it is
argued by Pitts (2002, p. 36, 98) that crime is the single biggest deterrent to
political, economic and social growth. According to statistics from 199743 , the
annual .violent crime rate in PNG was 2,000 incidents per 100,000, which is ten
times higher then in Australia and six times higher then in Fiji44 (Chand, 1997,
online). In reality, the number of crimes is likely much higher as most crimes go
undetected by the state and are not included in official statistics (Dinnen, 2001, p.
3).

39

2002 years data (UN Human Development Index, 2005, online).
Ages 15 and above, 2002 years data (UN Human Development Index, 2005, online).
41
Combined ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment in 2001/2002 (UN Human
Development Index, 2005, online).
42
2002 years data (UN Human Development Index, 2005, online).
43
See discussion in conclusion on the problem of reliable recent crime statistics.
44
Fiji is used for the comparison as it is a "Pacific island nation with a number of socioeconomic
similaritites to Papua New Guinea" (Chand, 1997, p. 2).
40
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The main cities in PNG, and especially the capital Port Moresby, have seen a
trend of an increasing level of crimes and violence. Port Moresby has been
referred to as one of the most dangerous cities in the world based on data
presented by the UN (Levantis cited in May, 2006, p. 158). The main cause of
crime and violence in the capital is the presence of so called raskols; criminals
dealing in petty crimes and crimes of violence and often attached to different
gangs (Dinnen, 2001, pp. 55-59; May, 2006, pp. 157-158; Squires, 2004, online).

These raskol gangs are a product of high unemployment figures, which hit young
men particularly hard45 . There is a pattern of young men migrating from rural to
urban areas, hoping to find a job and pursue their economic interests in a way that
would not be possible in the remote areas of the country, swelling the number of
unemployed (May, 2006, p. 152). There are economic opportunities in the cities,
mostly in Port Moresby, however these opportunities are only available to a
fortunate few and a large number find themselves isolated and marginalised in a
foreign city. To join a raskol gang can then provide the means of surviving on
criminal activities and of creating an identity (Dinnen, 2001, p. 58; Ward, 2000,
pp. 223-235). Pitts (2002, p. 36) argues that young males with no money and
little to do seek out targets for theft and aggression, resulting in armed robberies,
assaults and cmj acking.

45

See chapter 4.
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Gender-based violence against women in PNG is widespread and pervasive,
however, due to the lack of reliable and accurate data, the full extent ofthe
problem is unknown (Amnesty International, 2006a, online). In many areas of the
country women are not free to move safely around in their communities or walk to
school or work, as crimes such as rape, gang-rape and assaults are common
(Amnesty International, 2006b, online). Traditional village customs that served as
deterrents have weakened and are largely absent when young people move from
their village to a larger town or city (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, 2001, online). Furthermore, many communities are willing to settle
incidents of rape through material compensation instead of criminal prosecutions
and this contributes to the difficulty in combating rape crimes (Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2001, online).

Violence is also frequent in the highlands regions ofPNG. Inter-clan warfare has
traditionally been one of the most regular points of contact between clans, and it
can be regarded as a cultural phenomenon; a part oflife (Lemonnier, 1991, p. 9;
Strathern, 1979, pp. 49-84). In the dramatic geographical terrain made up from
mountain ranges and deep valleys and with the infrastructure being extremely
poor, the presence of state leaders and police is scarce and therefore the violence
is allowed to continue. May (2006, pp. 166-167)identifies the problem as being
one within the bureaucracy of inadequate resources as well as reflecting
"widespread lack of acceptance ofthe authority of the state". In many areas of the
highlands, police and defence troops are both out-numbered and out-gunned
(May, 2006, p. 167; Squires, 2005, online).
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Violence has especially been prevalent around election times 46 , with several
elections being compromised and the latest election in 2002 widely regarded as
the most violent election in the country's history (Garap, 2004, p. 2). Sir Michael
Somare, a highly experienced politician and the current Prime Minister, referred
to the 2002 election as "the worst he had ever seen in his political life" (May,
2006, p. 165).

Reilly (1997, p. 27) argued that election related violence can be seen as "rational
(if anti-social) behaviour in the face of an inappropriate system". With a high
number of contesting candidates due to the first-past-the-post election system the
result is a low level of support for the winner. Therefore, the number of votes
separating the winning candidate from that with the second highest number of
votes could potentially be relatively low. It follows that the impact violence could
have on supporters of the opposition, for example to intimidate them into voting
for a different candidate or to stop them from voting altogether, would sometimes
be enough to make a significant difference to the election outcome (Reilly, 1997,
p.27).

This connection between personal gain for individual politicians and a
deteriorating law and order situation again show how several of the main issues in
PNG span across the Index's categories and indicators. Crime and violence
deserves its own indicator to sufficiently evaluate its influence on the stability of
PNG, and this indicator needs to be closely linked to political and economic
problems. The Index is clearly insufficient in linking problems across categories
46

See Dinnen (2001, chapter 6) and Rumsey (1999) for further discussion on election related
violence.
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as is also evident when examining what is possibly the most severe social problem
facing PNG; the emerging HIVI AIDS epidemic.

Politicians in PNG have admitted that they have failed in responding to the rapid
spread ofHIV/AIDS, leaving the disease unmanaged for 15 years ("Sick No
Good", 2006). This has left PNG in a situation where people are uneducated and
the health care system is unable to cope. Today, an estimated 100,000 people are
infected by the disease, which translates to 2% of the PNG population47 , a
number 20 times of that in Australia (AusAID, 2006, p. 54, online; Cullen, 2006,
p. 153; "Sick No Good", 2006).

There are several reasons why HIV/AIDS in PNG has reached these proportions
and continues to spread at an alarming rate, with some of the most important
being widespread gang culture, violence against women, a lack of government
services such as healthcare, infrastructure and education, as well as a common
trust in herbal remedies and sorcery (AusAID, 2006, p. 53, online; "Sick No
Good", 2006). All theses reasons have their roots in cultural traditions and
poverty.

According to a recent Four Corners documentary ("Sick No Good", 2006), Port
Moresby is "the ideal setting for the spread of AIDS" due to its high levels of
violence, unsafe sex and prostitution. The gang-culture is one large contributor to
the spread ofHIV/AIDS in the capital (as well as in other large cities), as it is a
status sign in these raskol gangs to have many sexual partners. Rape is often
47

Dr Yves Renault, a WHO representative in PNG has estimated that one million Papua New
Guineans could be infected by 2015 and that the country is likely to experience an epidemic like
that seen in Africa (Renault, cited in Cullen, 2006, p. 153).
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carried out as a part of other crimes, such as break-ins and robbery48 and,
according to local gang members in the Port Moresby suburb of Gerehu, members
rape girls to show off ("Sick No Good", 2006).

The lack of education on HIVIAIDS further contributes to the problem as many
do not believe that condoms are essential in protecting themselves against the
disease (AusAID, 2006, pp. 72-74). The manager of a Port Moresby brothel,
pointed out by the police as one ofthe city's "AIDS hot spots" ("Sick No Good",
2006), does not consider the sexual health of the girls working for him as his
problem, and only occasionally would he tell them to use condoms. According to
a 2002 survey, 70 % of sex workers would not use a condom as their customers
would pay more for unprotected sex (Cullen, 2006, p. 156) Also, a recent study of
sex workers in PNG showed that 17 % are HIV positive, however the manager
interviewed in "Sick No Good" (2006) did not display any concern as he had
heard there existed a herbal cure for AIDS.

The lack of education on HIV/AIDS is als0 evident in the rural areas ofPNG,
with the chair of the PNG parliamentary committee on HIV/AIDS, Dr Banare
Bun, stating that 85 %of the rural population still lacked knowledge of the
disease (Cullen, 2006, p. 155). Furthermore, as the country suffers from extremely
poor infrastructure, the current efforts of organisations such as the UNAIDS do
not reach the more remote areas of the country (Cullen, 2006, p. 155).

48

Rape has traditionally been a part of tribal fighting and warfare. See Strathem (1979, pp. 49-50).
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As people are poorly educated, traditional taboos on talking about sex, and fears
and stigma connected with HIV/AIDS are still very strong (AusAID, 2006, p. 79,
online; "Sick No Good", 2006). This means that many people are afraid of getting
tested and live with the disease without knowing. It also prevents people from
receiving proper care as there have been cases of local doctors refusing to treat
HIVI AIDS infected patients, as well as of families disowning infected family
members (AusAID, 2006, p. 64, online; "Sick No Good", 2006).

Even if infected people do get admitted to hospitals, there are insufficient
resources to treat the patients. According to Cullen (2006, p. 160), AIDS is the
leading cause of death at the Port Moresby General Hospital and Sister Elizabeth
Waken, who is in charge of the unofficial AIDS ward at the hospital, says that
they often run out of basic medicines and supplies. The hospital cannot find
enough staff to work in the ward and there is not enough money to ensure that the
patients are fed ("Sick No Good", 2006).

Although the PNG government has started· to take action against the spread of
HIV/AIDS in the country, the current infection and its growth rates together with
the deeply rooted traditions of sexual practices and attitudes of the population
makes for extreme problems in the near future as shown by the AusAID report

Impacts ofHIVIAIDS 2005-2025 in Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and East
Timo/ 9 (2006, online). One workforce sector that is hard-hit is education where
PNG is already losing at least one teacher each week to HIV/AIDS related causes
(Morris & Stewart, 2005, online). According to the Department ofForeign Affairs
49

This report is mainly concerned with predicted scenarios for the next two decades and only
provides limited information on the current situation.
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and Trade (2004, p. 9), a study done in 2002 showed that a worse-case scenario
would see the total number of deaths from HIV/AIDS each year reach 120,000 by
2020. IfPNG continues its current response to HIV/AIDS, over 300,000 adults
will die as a result ofHIV/AIDS related illness over the next 20 years (AusAID,
2006, p. 79). This could mean that a third of the PNG workforce would be wiped
out resulting in dire social and economic consequences.

It is therefore clear that the HN/AIDS epidemic is not only a social problem but it

has the obvious potential to create huge economic problems and it needs a firm
political response. Again the Index has failed to provide an indicator for an
extremely important issue, and the need for links between political, economic and
social indicators has been further highlighted.

63

Conclusion

The key aim of this thesis has been to examine how failed state theory is
represented in the PSI and to what extent the Index accurately captures the
challenges facing Papua New Guinea. The significance ofthis aim is highlighted
by the academic discourse on failed, failing and weak states which has attracted
increased attention since the September 11 attacks. This served as an eye-opener
for the western world; global security could be severely threatened and attacked
by elements originating in failing states. Some have referred to this discourse as a
'theory' as has this thesis, however, most experts treat failed state theory as a
broad concept and suggest it needs further research.

Failed state theory has the potential to become an important political tool,
however there has yet to emerge a universal agreement on the definition of state
failure. To be applicable, the definitions used in the 'theory' needs to be specific
enough to discuss details contributing to state failure, yet broad enough to apply to
different countries experiencing varying problems. It follows that an attempt to
incorporate failed state theory into an analytical tool will face problems in how it
uses definitive categories to assess countries.

A recent attempt to incorporate the ideas from failed state theory in order to use it
as a tool for analysis of states has been the PSI. It incorporates the CAST
methodology of 12 indicators which are designed to identify signs of state failure.
By giving each of these indicators a rating between 0 and10, a country can be
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given a number which places it on a continuum ranging from collapsed to weak
states.

The FSI is a welcome contribution to the furthering of a global understanding of
the phenomenon of state failure. By placing its indicators into political, economic
and social categories, it provides a broad assessment of how a country is
performing in each of these areas. Potentially it has the capacity to break down the
overall performance of a country and pin-point particular areas where the main
problems lie. It follows that it could be an important assessment tool that can help
improving the stability of a state, as well as predict and, hopefully, prevent future
problems.

The case study presented in this thesis serves as a test for how useful the FSI is in
analysing the situation in one particular country; in this case Papua New Guinea.
By examining how the Index's indicators apply to PNG, and comparing this to
primary and secondary sources providing information about the current situation
in the country, a number of conclusions can be drawn.

First, the Index does not posses a sufficient number of indicators to fully assess
the political, economic and social situation within a given country. This is shown
by the lack of indicators for such important issues as HIV/AIDS and crime and
violence. HIV/AIDS has been classified as an epidemic in PNG; it is spreading
rapidly and the health system is already unable to cope. Furthermore, HIVI AIDS
has reached extreme levels in many African countries where it is associated with
state failure. It therefore seems that it should be included as an indicator. Crime
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and violence is also a widespread problem in PNG and its severity, both in the
cities and in rural areas, necessitates the need for an indicator dealing with it ·
directly.

Crime and violence is, however, partly accounted for in some ofthe indicators,
which leads to the second conclusion: some indicators are too narrowly defined.
The indicators for public services and group grievances both partly accommodate
for problems related to crime and violence but the limitations of these indicators,
as specified by their definitions, mean that the indicators are insufficient in taking
into account the full extent of the crime and violence problem. For example,
group grievances seems to account for the problems caused by inter-tribal warfare
in the highlands, but not the problems caused by raskol gangs in the cities.
Furthermore, PNG's economic dependence on foreign aid should clearly be
included in the economic indicators, however they are too narrowly defined to
specifically deal with it. Australia's influence in PNG is still relatively strong,
mainly because it provides such a significant amount of aid each year, and the
ability of the PNG state to function fully independently of Australia is
questionable. This problem is accounted for by the Index in the political indicator
of external influence, but it is also an economic problem. Therefore, the third
conclusion is that the Index needs better linking between different indicators.

The Index fails to link indicators together when analysing a problem, such as
economic problems caused by the dependence on aid and the demographic
pressure, which is included in the social indicators. For the Index to be able to
accurately assess the situation in a country, it needs to rely on cross-category
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analyses of the problems, rather than on a rating that is made up from the issues
being treated separately as is the case today. This is obvious when considering the
HIV/AIDS epidemic that is currently facing PNG. To fully analyse and
understand the impacts of the epidemic, both social, political and economic issues
must be considered. Furthermore, several of the issues covered by the Index's
indicators have the capacity to affect each other. They are all related to the
political indicator of state legitimacy as this determines the ability of the state to
deal with the problems facing it. Therefore, an attempt to provide a country
assessment based on separately treated issues, such as the indicators of the FSI,
will always have problems with painting the full picture.

Fourth, the use of a research window presents problems with consistency and the
inability to analyse events further in the past. This is exemplified by the
Bougainville conflict which, although the violence stopped nearly a decade ago,
I

still affects PNG's stability through political and economic problems. Also, as the
Bougainville Province will be allowed to hold a referendum on the question of its
proposed independence, Bougainville has the capacity to significantly influence
PNG's stability in the future. Furthermore, the estimated problems ofHIV/AIDS
that will face the country over the next couple of decades stress the importance of
considering issues outside of the limited time frame of the research window as
they are so severe that the Index should clearly accommodate for them in its
assessment ofPNG.
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Furthermore, an assessment of a country based on the ideas of failed state theory
win· always rely heavily upon the existence of reliable and adequate data. In its
data collection, the FSI relies on software that scans 'tens of thousands' opensource reports and articles. This method is designed to register a country's number
of positive and negative hits related to each ofthe indicators, however, it does not
seem to allow for lack of consistent or reliable data. As has been shown in this
thesis, there appears to be a range of conflicting unemployment figures in PNG, as
well as a lack of reliable crime data. The indicator for human flight rated high due
to PNG's problem of people leaving to seek better opportunities abroad.
According to the Index, this is a severe problem, scoring 8.0 out of 10, and it
constitutes a twelfth ofPNG's overall assessment even though it is not generally
recognised as a severe problem in the literature on PNG. This questions the
Index's use of data. Also, as shown in tables 3 and 4, the data for basic social
indicators vary from one report to another. Therefore it can be concluded that the
problem posed by the lack of reliable and consistent data will inevitably affect any
attempt to analyse PNG, and the FSI' s assessment is no exception.

Having analysed key political, economic and social issues in PNG, it is clear that
there are problems that the Index has not adequately dealt with. This would
suggest that the rating of PNG as a weak state may be somewhat optimistic and
that it is perhaps closer to being a failing state 50 • However, this raises the question
of what exactly constitutes a weak, a failing, or a failed state. As different states
face ,Problems to different extents, or different problems altogether, one 'weak' or
'failing' state may be functioning in a considerably different way to a second

50
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As already argued by number of experts, see Denoon (2005).
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'weak' or 'failing' state. One state may be severely 'failing' in some areas but still
function well in others. Would this mean that it is 'failing' more or less than a
state that faces a wider range of less severe problems?

The Index has, however, identified some key problems in PNG, and it makes a
valuable contribution to the understanding of the current situation in the country.
It can therefore be concluded that the Index has a limited usefulness which can be
improved if some or all of the shortcomings, as discussed in this thesis, are
addressed. However, as failed state theory is still evolving, both the Index and the
'theory' need to be further researched to find a balance between making
assessments based on specific indicators and being applicable as a broad concept.
It is currently unclear whether this is achievable, but the significance of the
problem of state failure and the potential of failed state theory to improve the
global security and humanitarian situation justifies future attempts.
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Rank

Country

Total Score

1

Sudan

112.3

2

Dem. Rep. ofthe Congo

110.1

3

Ivory Coast

109.2

4

Iraq

109.0

5

Zimbabwe

108.9

6

Chad

105.9

6

Somalia

105.9

8

Haiti

104.6

9

Pakistan

103.1

10

Afghanistan

99.8

11

Guinea

99

11

Liberia

99

13

Central African Republic

97.5

14

North Korea

97.3

15

Burundi

96.7

16

Yemen

96.6

16

Sierra. Leone

96.6

18

Burma

96.5

19

Bangladesh

96.3

20

Nepal

95.4

21

Uganda

94.5

22

Nigeria

94.4

22

Uzbekistan

94.4

24

Rwanda

92.9

25

Sri Lanka

92.4

26

Ethiopia

91.9

27

Colombia

91.8

28

Kyrgyzstan

90.3

29

Malawi

89.8
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30

Burkina Faso

89.7

31

Egypt

89.5

32

Indonesia

89.2

33

Syria

88.6

33

Kenya

88.6

35

Bosnia and Herzegovina

88.5

36

Cameroon

88.4

37

Angola

88.3

37

Togo

88.3

39

Bhutan

87.9

39

Laos

87.9

41

Mauritania

87.8

42

Tajikistan

87.7

43

Russia

87.1

44

Niger

87

45

Turkmenistan

86.1

46

Guinea-Bissau

85.4

47

Cambodia

85

47

Dominic Republic

85

49

Papua New Guinea

84.6

50

Belarus

84.5

51
52
52

Guatemala
Equatorial Guinea

84.3

Iran

84
84

54

Eritrea

83.9

55

Serbia and Montenegro

83.8

56

Bolivia

82.9

57

China

82.5

57

Moldova

82.5

59

Nicaragua

82.4

(>0

Georgia

82.2

Source: Failed States Index, (2006c, online).
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Appendix B - The Indicators of the FSI

Social indicators:

Mounting demographic pressure- Pressures deriving from high population
density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources; Pressures
deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in
common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity,
travel, social interaction, religious worship; Pressures deriving from group
settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or
occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or
historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards; Pressures from skewed
population distributions, such as a "youth or age bulge," or from divergent rates of
population growth among competing communal groups;

Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex
humanitarian emergencies- Forced uprooting oflarge communities as a result of
random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease,
lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger
humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries.

A legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia -History of
aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date
back centuries; Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal
groups; Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups,
for persecution .or repression; Institutionalized political exclusion; Public
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scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as
evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or
nationalistic political rhetoric.

Chronic and sustained human flight- "Brain drain" of professionals, intellectuals
and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression; Voluntary emigration of
"the middle class," particularly economically productive segments of the
population, such as entrepreneurs, business people, artisans and traders, due to
economic deterioration; Growth of exile communities.

Economic indicators:

Uneven economic development along group lines - Group-based inequality, or
perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status; Group-based
impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education
levels; Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group
inequalities.

Sharp and I or severe economic decline- A pattern of progressive economic
decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt,
child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic
measures; Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or
debt payments; Collapse or devaluation of the national currency; Extreme social
hard!)hip imposed by economic austerity programs; Growth of hidden economies,
including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight; Increase in levels of
corruption and illicit transactions among the general populace; Failure of the state
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to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other
financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments.

The political indicators:
Criminalisation and I or delegitimisation of the state -Massive and endemic
corruption or profiteering by mling elites; Resistance of mling elites to
transparency, accountability and political representation; Widespread loss of
popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or
contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience,
inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of
armed insurgencies; Growth of crime syndicates linked to mling elites.

Progressive deterioration ofpublic services - Disappearance of basic state
functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism
and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education,
sanitation, public transportation; State apparatus narrows to those agencies that
serve the mling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank,
diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies.

The suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread
violation of human rights; - Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military
mle in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are
susp.ended or manipulated; Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to
criminal) violence against innocent civilians; Rising number of political prisoners
or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and

82

practices; Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of
individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press,
politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public
repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution).

Security apparatus operates as a "state within a state" - Emergence of elite or
praetorian guards that operate with impunity; Emergence of state-sponsored or
state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected
"enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition; Emergence of an
"army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or
political clique; Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an
armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces.

The rise offactionalised elites -Fragmentation of ruling elites and state
institutions along group lines; Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling
elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a "greater Serbia") or of
communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith").

Intervention of other states or external political actors -Military or Para-military
engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states,
identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of
the conflict; Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards overdep~ndence

on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions.

Source: Failed States Index, (2006h, online).
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Appendix C- The CAST system

Methodology Behind CAST
The CAST methodology presents a framework for early warning and assessment
of societies at risk of internal conflict and state collapse. The model can be used to
enable the international community to take preventive action to stem conflict,
prepare for peacekeeping and stability missions, assess conditions for sustainable
security and provide metrics or measures of effectiveness for post-conflict
reconstruction. For an example of how the methodology has been used, please see
our Iraq reports.
The steps of the methodology are the following:

1. Pre-Assessment Steps

To prepare for Conflict Assessment:
•
•
•

Collect relevant conflict data
Develop a complete chronology of events
Choose key dates for Trend Point assessment

2. Rating The Twelve Indicators
'

The "What's Going On?" Step
Social Indicators
1. Mounting Demographic Pressures
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating
Complex Humanitarian Emergencies
3. Legacy ofVengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight
Economic Indicators
5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline
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Political Indicators
7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization ofthe State
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread
Violation of Human Rights
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"
11. Rise ofFactionalized Elites
12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors
Indicators measure the key social, economic, political and military conditions
within a state at a given date.
Basic Steps:
•

Rate each indicator on scale of 0 (low intensity) to 10 (high intensity)

•

Total ratings to get trend points

•

Build aggregate and individual indicator trend lines

3. Assessing The Core, Five

The "What Have We Got to Work With?" Step
Core Five assessment helps determine the capacity of core institutions to manage
the situation at hand or a state's "capacity to cope".
For sustainable security, a state should have the following Core Five:
•
•
•
•
•

A competent domestic police force and corrections system
An efficient and functioning civil service or professional bureaucracy
An independent judicial system that works under the rule of law
A professional and disciplined military accountable to a legitimate civilian
government
A strong executive/legislative leadership capable of national governance
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4. Identifying STINGS

The "What Else is Relevant?" Step
STINGS are the unanticipated factors that act as catalysts to accelerate or
decelerate the immediate risk of conflict
STINGS is an acronym used here to describe:
•
•
•
•
•

Surprises (e.g., currency collapse)
Triggers (e.g., assassinations, coup d'etats)
Idiosyncrasies (e.g., non-contiguous territory, a deference to authority)
National Temperaments (e.g., cultural or religious perspectives)
Spoilers (e.g., disgruntled followers, excluded parties)

5. Building a Conflict Map

The "What's the Big Picture?" Step
Plotting the course of the conflict for each significant date allows one to visually
depict the potential for the conflict to turn violent or to be resolved.
Source: Failed States Index, (2006e, online).
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Appendix D - Prime Ministers in PNG since independence

September 1975- March 1980

Michael Somare

March 1980- August 1982

Julius Chan

August 1982- November 1985

Michael Somare

November 1985- July 1988

Paias Wingti

July 1988- July 1992

Rabbie Namaliu

July 1992 -August 1994

Paias Wingti

September 1994- March 1997

Julius Chan

March 1997 - July 1997

John Gihenu

July 1997- July 1999

Bill Skate

July 1999 -August 2002

Mekere Morauta

August 2002 -Present

Michael Somare

Sources: Turner, (2001, p. 291); The World Fact Book, (2006, online).
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Appendix E - Selected Election Statistics in PNG

Sitting Members of Parliament returned 1992 - 2002
1992 1997 2002
Members returned
44
55
(%)
(40) (50.5) (25)
Sources: Dorney, (1997, online);
Griffin, (1997, p. 76); May, (2006, p. 164).

Number of Candidates 1977- 1997
1977
879

1982 1987
1125 ' 1513

1992
1655

Number of
Candidates
8.1 10.3 13.9 15.2
Average per
electorate
Sources: May, (2004, p. 4); Reilly, (2002a, p. 248).

1997
2372
21.7

Number of winning candidates receiving
less than 20% of votes 1977-1997
1977
11

Number of
Candidates
Source: Reilly, (2002a, p. 248).

1982
24

1987
41

1992
54

1997
62

1992
9

1997
15

Number ofwinning candidates receiving
less than 10% ofvotes 1977-1997
1977
Number of
Candidates
Source: Reilly, (2002a, p. 248).

1982
4

1987
2
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